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THE SELLERS OF LABOR AND CORPORATE MERGERS
James C. Thomas*
I. The Problem
At least since Adam and Eve were driven from the Garden of Eden, the
survival of man demanded the burden of work. "From childhood to the grave,
the wage earner is haunted by the specter of poverty and misery."1 When dis-
charged from work, a person's attitude, reflecting the stage of unemployment, goes
"from optimism through pessimism to fatalism."' As the length of the unemploy-
ment period increases, one may even become unemployable. Because of the
psychological effects of unemployment, which some believe reduces the effective-
ness of a person as a good worker, many employers ".... have a policy of not
hiring people who have been unemployed for longer than a certain period."'
Corporate mergers increase unemployment and contribute greatly to a
slower job growth.4 Absent any statistical studies in this area, it is impossible to
offer any estimate of the number of jobs eliminated as a result of corporate
mergers. The Temporary National Economic Committee did note, however, in
its 1941 report, that unless the trend toward economic concentration was reversed
".... the opportunity of those individuals who will constitute the next generation
will be completely foreclosed."' Increased economic concentration is, likewise,
having a detrimental effect on the ability of unions to bargain collectively for the
rights of employees.'
Statistics compiled by the Federal Trade Commission show a total of 1,528
acquisitions of manufacturing and mining firms with assets of ten million dollars
or more from 1948 through 1970.' It is obvious that one cannot conclude what
the net effect of the total number of mergers had on employment. To make this
type determination, a case-by-case study would be required. The effect upon
employment would depend on the type of merger involved and the degree of
consolidation that followed.'
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1 A. EPsTmN, INSECURITY, A CHALLENGE TO AMERICA 17 (2d ed. 1938).
2 Eisenberg & Lazarsfeld, The Psychological Effects of Unemployment, 35 PSYCH. BULL.
358, 377 (1938).
3 Tucker, Some Correlates of Certain Attitudes of the Unemployed, 35 ARCH. PSYCH.
7 (1940).
4 See J. UDELL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE MERGER MOVEMENT IN
WISCONSIN (1969). From correspondence with the Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, and the Interstate Commerce Commission, there appears to be a scarcity of
statistical studies on the effects of mergers on employees and employment.
5 TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC CoMM., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF
ECONOMIC POWER, S. DOc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1941) [hereafter referred to as
TNEC REPORT].
6 S. Res. 40, pt. 8A, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 453-57 (1969).
7 FTC, STATISTICAL REPORT No. 7, LARGE MERGERS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING,
1948-1970 6 (1971). The total number of corporate mergers during 1970 was 2,916, which
represented a 35.8 percent decline from the 1969 total of 4,542. This was due in part to a
lack of confidence and a weakness in the securities markets. H. Res. 161, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 439 (1971).
8 Of the total number of 1,528 large mergers reported by the FTC during the period
of 1948-1970, the classification was as follows: 234 horizontal, 194 vertical, 1,100 conglomerate,
743 product extension, 66 market extension, and 291 other. FTC, supra note 7, at 7.
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A higher degree of consolidation will normally follow horizontal mergers,
and to a lesser extent, product and market extension mergers. With these mergers,
the facilities of the companies can more easily be brought together. Consequently,
one could expect a reduction in the number of employees needed to maintain the
same level of production. Conglomerate mergers, which create an umbrella
against market risk and uncertainties, present different and peculiar problems to
employees.9
No attempt is made in this article to measure the total impact which corpo-
rate mergers have on employees. Such a bold project would require facilities and
financial resources not within the possession of nor available to the writer at the
present time. The purpose of this article is limited to a discussion of the federal
antitrust laws as a possible way of effectively protecting employees. Particular
attention will be focused on the right of employees to initiate private antitrust
actions.
If the federal antitrust laws were vigorously enforced in connection with
corporate mergers, employees would be protected against sudden terminations,
unfavorable transfers, and loss of retirement benefits. As Judge Learned Hand
stated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America," the most basic assumption
drawn from the history of all antitrust statutes is that the congressional purpose
".. . was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost,
an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other." An economic system so described would generate more jobs and increase
employee protection through the forces of free competition."
Congress passed the Celler-Kefauver amendment to section seven of the
Clayton Act out of a ". .. fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of
economic concentration in the American economy."' 2 This rising tide of eco-
nomic concentration was causing a loss of local control over industry;" it was
threatening the organization of industry in small units. "Where an industry was
composed of numerous independent units, Congress appeared anxious to preserve
this structure."' 4 Former Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in the
9 See S. Res. 40, pt. 8A, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 453-57 (1969). Conglomerates may alter
collective bargaining and seriously reduce the power of the strike. With the conglomerate, the
union may experience increased difficulty in identifying the company charged with the duty
to bargain. Collective bargaining may also be affected if conglomerates reduce the effective
force of strike power. Within the conglomerate, the struck company can be supported by the
parent and the other companies operating under the same umbrella. With their vast resources,
conglomerates are able to sustain a strike for a prolonged period of time.
10 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
11 Besides the forces of free competition, employees may seek to gain protection by organiz-
ing into labor unions. For this device to provide effective protection, it would be essential for
the union to be of sufficient size and power to check the power of the corporate employer. One
of the stated purposes for the Celler-Kefauver Act, Clayton Act § 7, 15 USC § 18 (1970),
was to check the growth of large labor unions. "The concentration of great economic power
in a few corporations necessarily leads to the formation of large nation-wide labor unions.
The development of the two necessarily leads to big bureaus in the Government to deal with
them." H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949).
12 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962). See also, H.R. REP. No.
1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; S. RaP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. '(1950).
13 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962).
14 Id. at 333.
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Brown Shoe case, spoke of this as "... the economic way of life sought to be
preserved by Congress."'"
To look upon the federal antitrust legislation as being purely economic in
nature is erroneous and self-defeating; the legislation was designed to achieve a
social balance, a system of political independence, and an economic way of life. 6
As the Supreme Court noted in United States u. Philadelphia National Bank,'
Congress, with passage of section seven of the Clayton Act,'" was expressing con-
cern "with the protection of competition, not competitors."'9 Competition, con-
sidered conceptually, is the economic way of life which controls all segments of
our society, including employment opportunities and protection of workers.
Following this idea of competition, Judge Dawson, in United States v.
Kennecott Copper Corp.,2" stated: "[W]e are concerned not alone with the prob-
able effects of a merger upon a particular line of commerce but also its probable
effects upon the economic way of life in the industry."'" A similar judicial
philosophy was expressed in United States v. White Consolidated Industries,
Inc.22 by Judge Battisti:
This case is not so much a contest between the United States Depart-
ment of Justice and the two defendant companies as a skirmish in a broader
battle over the direction American economic life will take in the coming
years.
23
Congress considered the tendency toward economic concentration to be
"undesirable from a social standpoint."2 4 As recorded in the final report of the
Temporary National Economic Committee, a reversal of the tendency toward
economic concentration was essential to protect ourselves from the domination
of economic authority.2" Permanent decentralization was considered necessary
".... if the ideals of a democratic social and economic structure for all our people
are to be achieved." 8 Under this democratic structure, it was recognized and
15 Id.
16 See Thomas, Conglomerate Merger Syndrome-A Comparison: Congressional Policy
with Enforcement Policy, 36 FoRDeAm L. Rnv. 461 (1968).
17 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
18 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
19 United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 N. 43 (1963). But see
how Professor Turner uses this language to support certain mergers that yield significant eco-
nomics. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. Rnv.
1313, 1324, 1353 (1965). The weakness in Professor Turner's logic is that he ignores the
social and political consequences of mergers, which he measures by purely economic standards.
20 231 F. Supp. 95 "(S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. F.T.C., 467
F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972).
21 United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
22 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
23 United States v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (N.D. Ohio
1971). For a court following the pure-economic approach, see, United States v. Int'l Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970).
24 United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
25 TNEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. The TNEC REPORT, although released in 1941, is
still significant to an understanding of the Celler-Kefauver Act which amended section seven
of the Clayton Act in 1950. In the House Committee Report favoring this amendment, the
findings of the TNEC REPORT were incorporated. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1949). These TNEC findings have also been relied on by the Supreme Court. Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 314 (1962).
26 TNEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
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reaffirmed that "... all power originates in all of the people and not in any part
of them. 27
As a result of the unchecked trend of economic concentration, the people
have been forced to surrender local self-government. 2' Governors of great states
and mayors of large cities have been forced to beg the central government "... to
undertake Federal enterprises in the local communities to solve local problems of
unemployment."2 9 This trend must be reversed, according to the early congres-
sional findings, if the opportunities of future generations are not to be completely
foreclosed."0 In the 1914 Clayton Act debates, Congressman Kelly observed that
the evils which have brought concentration of wealth are the same evils that have
caused a diffusion of poverty.31
All members of our society, seeking protection of their special interest, must
of necessity rely on the preservation of the economic way of life constructed upon
the forces of free competition. The nature of the special interest is immaterial;
it may involve business interest, employment protection, or consumption. It
would be impossible to have separate economic systems-one for business and
capital investments and one for employment interest. The federal antitrust laws
were passed to protect a single economic system. 2
The Sherman Act was passed by Congress in a social setting of economic
suppression.3 The late Justice Harlan saw the people of this country being placed
in bondage to the great aggregations of capital controlled by a few individuals
and corporations.3 4 With this concentrated economic power, there was a philos-
ophy that workers should be suppressed into industrial slavery, and that the
enormous profits should be distributed to the relatively small number of share-
27 .d. at 5. "If the political structure is designed to preserve the freedom of the individ-
ual, the economic structure must not be permitted to destroy it." Id. In the House Com-
mittee Report, favoring the antimerger bill, it was observed that the alternative to capitalism
is some form of statism. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949). Congressman
Celler, in the debates, was of the opinion that our political system could be changed from
democracy to socialism unless mergers were stopped. 95 CONG. R c. 11486 (1949) (re-
marks of Congressman Celler). He stated: "I want no manner or kind of collectivism or
totalitarianism. These mergers are usually the forerunners of collectivism and socialism and
therein lies the danger." Id. Congressman Patman of Texas declared: "Merger must be
stopped now, or else the big corporations will become so big that there will be nothing left
to do except for the Government to take them over. . . . This is the very thing we all are
trying to avoid." Id. at 11498 (remarks of Congressman Patman). See also the acerbity Justice
Douglas expressed in the dissenting opinion filed in United States v. Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
534 (1948); and the concurring opinion filed in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384
U.S. 546, 553 (1966).
28 TNEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
29 Id. at 6.
30 Id. at 9.
31 51 CONG. Rac. 9087 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Kelly).
32 The late Justice Harlan, describing the condition of the country in 1890, the year
Congress passed the Sherman Act, observed:
[Tlhere was everywhere, among the people generally, a deep feeling of unrest. The
Nation had been rid of human slavery . . . but the conviction was universal that the
country was in real danger from another kind of slavery sought to be fastened on
the American people, namely, the slavery that would result from aggregations of
capital in the hands of a few individuals and corporations ..
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83-84 (1911) (concurring and dis-
senting opinion).
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
34 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83-84 (1911).
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holders. 5 Life of the American workers was described as being "... so inhuman
as to make our former Negro slavery infinitely preferable." 6
The social unrest of the people in their struggle with economic concentration
represented a serious threat to our entire legal system; it was compared with the
unrest leading to the American Revolution and Civil War.3 Congressman Kelly,
in the Clayton Act debates, warned that unless the "brazen defiance" of the
antitrust laws was stopped ".... the masses of the people will forget their patient
endurance of injustice and long suffering submission to wrong on the part of
exploiting combinations and start a conflagration against which fire insurance
will offer no protection."3'
If employees are to be protected against corporate mergers and resulting
increases in economic concentration, the antitrust laws must be vigorously en-
forced. Since passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, most congressional action in
the field of antitrust has been aimed at improving enforcement. In 1941, the
Temporary National Economic Committee called for the ". . . vigorous and
vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws."40 With the Celler-Kefauver Act,
Congress sought to plug the loopholes in section seven of the Clayton Act.4 '
Consistent with the congressional policy opposing the concentration of
economic power, the Supreme Court, starting with the Brown Shoe case, has
been systematically strildng down corporate mergers.42 To the extent that corpo-
rate mergers are challenged by the Justice Department or the Federal Trade
Commission, employees are protected; the possible loss of jobs is avoided. In Ford
Motor Co. v. United States43 the employees received specific and more definite
protection. The decree protected employees of the New Fostoria plant by order-
ing Ford to condition its divestiture sale on the purchaser's assuming the existing
35 L. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 38 (1935).
36 Id. "The result is physical and moral degeneracy-work, work, work without recreation
or any possibility of relief save that which dissipation brings." Id.
37 Id. at 39.
38 51 CONG. REc. 9087 (1914) (Remarks of Congressman Kelly).
39 "If the Sherman Act had been executed by the responsible officials, few of the three
hundred monopolies or trusts that axe now in existence . . .would be in existence now."
51 CONG. REC. 14260 (1914) (remarks of Senator Borah). A lack of congressional confidence
was expressed in the Attorney General's enforcement policy. Id. at 14514, 14260; id. at 14261
(Senator Lane suggested that if the Sherman Act was sufficient, Congress should turn its atten-
tion to the responsible officials and pass laws to force them to do their duty).
There was also congressional opposition to the loose judicial construction of the Sher-
man Act. Id. at 15985 (remarks of Senator Borah); id. at 9077 (remarks of Mr. Volstead);
id. at 14222 (remarks of Senator Thompson); id. at 9674 (remarks of Mr. Buchanan). Fol-
lowing these debates Congress passed the bill, creating the Federal Trade Commission, 38
Stat. 717 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 '(1970) and enacted the Clayton Act, 38
Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
For a more comprehensive analysis of the Congressional design for enforcement, see
Thomas, A Challenge to Conglomerates: Private Treble Damage Suits, 3 LOYOLA U.L.A. L.
Rlv. 292 (1970).
40 TNEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
41 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962).
42 United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. El
Paso Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Alcoa, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 '(1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Citizen Publishing
Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, 402 U.S.
549 (1971); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
43 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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wage and pension obligations and to offer employment to any employee displaced
by a transfer of nonplug operations from the divested plant.44
Employees have adequate protection against the loss of jobs resulting from
illegal corporate mergers; however, the problem is that too few of these mergers
are actually challenged by one of the two official enforcement agencies.45 In
search of a reason for this enforcement experience, one is left only to speculate.
It was recently suggested that special treatment was given to certain merging
corporations."6 Most decisions not to prosecute a merger are probably based on
economic philosophy. Some suggest that governmental self-restraint in the
prosecution of mergers is preferable. Unlike private antitrust suits, public enforce-
ment agencies are encouraged to take a "relatively calm and rational approach"
to corporate mergers.4
Private antitrust suits, an alternative to official governmental action, may
be the only way to ensure a vigorous, untarnished enforcement policy. 9 Section
four of the Clayton Act allows any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws to sue and recover
threefold the damage sustained."0 In addition to treble damages, section 16 of
the Clayton Act authorizes any person, firm, corporation, or association to seek in-
junctive relief against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws.
51
To sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, one must show
44 Id. at 572. Ford did not challenge the portion of the decree that protected employees.
45 During the year 1967 the Federal Trade Commission reported a total of 1,496 corporate
mergers, of which only 16 were challenged; for 1968, there were 2,442 mergers, of which 124
were challenged. For the year 1967, there were 169 major mergers (acquired firm had $10
million or more in assets), of which 6 were challenged; in 1968 there were 193 major mergers,
of which 9 were challenged. Thomas, A Challenge to Conglomerates: Private Treble Damage
Suits, supra note 39, at 314-15.
46 The most notable contemporary case involved the ITT settlement. An appeal of an
adverse ruling by the government was allegedly dropped after a $200,000 political contribution.
United States v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970). There are numerous
news stories on the matter. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 4; id., Mar. 3, 1972, §
C, at 1, col. 4; id., Mar. 9, 1972, § C, at 1, col. 6; id., Mar. 9, 1972, § C, at 28, cols. 1, 3;
id., Mar. 12, 1972, § 1, at 50, col. 1; id., Mar. 12, 1972, § 4, at 1, col. 6; NEWSWEEK, Mar.
20, 1972, at 24; TImE, Mar. 20, 1972, at 13; id., Mar. 27, 1972, at 86; id. at 28; id., Apr. 3,
1972, at 15; id. at 40; id., Apr. 10, 1972, at 29.
47 Professor Day suggests that prosecution of mergers and the decision to seek divestiture
must involve broader public interest considerations. For this reason, he is willing to exclude
all private antitrust actions against mergers. Day, Private Actions Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 29 A.B.A. Antitrust Sec. 155, 162 (1965). See also C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY, AN ECONoMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 117, 258 (1959); but see United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966).
48 Day, Private Actions Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, supra, note 47, at 160.
49 Professors Kaysen and Turner urge: "There should be no private right of action based
on the acquisition of 'unreasonable market power.'" C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, supra note 47,
at 258. "It is unfair for private plaintiffs to collect treble damages for conduct the illegality
of which cannot be readily determined in advance." Id. at 257. There is judicial authority
for the proposition that "[t]here can be no claim for money damages for a violation of Section
7 [of the Clayton Act]." Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488, 493 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964); but see Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414
F.2d 956 '(2d Cir. 1969). There appears to be little merit in the position denying any treble
damage relief to private plaintiffs alleging a violation of section seven of the Clayton Act.
Thomas, A Challenge to Conglomerates: Private Treble Damage Suits, supra note 39, at 292.
See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
50 15 U.S.C.§ 15 (1970).
51 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
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an injury to his "business or property"; this same requirement is not included in
section 16 of the Act for one seeking injunctive relief. "The most likely explana-
tion" for the wording of these two sections of the Act, according to the Supreme
Court, "... lies in the essential differences between the two remedies."52 It was
noted in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co." that ".... there is a striking contrast
between the potential impact of suits for injunctive relief and suits for damages.""4
There would be little difference in the impact of a single suit or a hundred
suits in which only injunctive relief is sought. One injunction is just as effective as
100; likewise, 100 injunctions are no more effective than one.5 "The position
of a defendant faced with numerous claims for damages is much different."5 "
At first glance, it might appear as if the Hawaii Court was suggesting a stricter
position for treble damage suits. This, however, is not in fact the case. The Court
was not concerned with the number of treble damage claims that might be filed;
rather, it was concerned with the possibility of duplicative recoveries of damages."
Treble damage relief was denied to the State of Hawaii suing under section
four of the Clayton Act in its parens patriae capacity, as opposed to its proprietary
capacity. With injunctive relief, the Court reasoned that the capacity of the state,
parens patriae or proprietary, would be of little consequence.58 The State of
Hawaii in its proprietary capacity could sue for damages under section four of
the Clayton Act. Injured in its capacity as a consumer, the state could recover
damages measured by the amount of the overcharge.5 9 This same right of re-
covery is given ".... to every citizen of Hawaii with respect to any damage to
business or property.""0 It is this citizen-right that precludes the State of Hawaii
from recovering damages in its parens patriae capacity."' If permitted, both the
state and the citizen could recover damages for identical losses; the Court refused
to open this door to duplicate recoveries.2
The State of Hawaii argued that it should be allowed to prosecute an anti-
trust claim in its parens patriae capacity because "protracted litigation [would]
render private citizens impotent.""3 Unless the state is allowed to sue for injury to
her quasi-sovereign interest or for injury to the general economy, antitrust viola-
52 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972).
53 Id. at 251.
54 Id. at 262.
55 Id. at 261.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 264.
58 Id. at 261.
59 Id. at 262, n. 14.
60 Id. at 263. Recognition of this citizen right indicates that the Court was not con-
cerned over the number of suits filed for damages. The impact of damage claims referred to
by the Court, id. at 262, related only to potential duplicative recoveries. Besides the parens
patriae action, the State of Hawaii had sought to include all consumers in a proposed class
action. This proposal was dismissed by the lower court on the ground that the class was
unwieldy. Nevertheless, the Court conceded that the State might be allowed to bring a class
action on behalf of some or all of the consumer citizens. Id. at 266.
61 In its parens patriae capacity, the State of Hawaii was seeking ... to recover damages
for injury to its general economy." Id. at 264. Injury to the general economy is only ". . . a
reflection of injuries to the 'business or property' of consumers, for which they may recover
themselves under § 4." Id. This is the duplicative recovery referred to by the Court.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 265.
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tions would go virtually unremedied." The Court responded, however, that
"[p]rivate citizens are not as powerless... as the State suggests."
65
Relief under section four of the Clayton Act could have been denied Hawaii,
acting in its parens patriae capacity, on two theories. Conceivably, the Court
could have concluded that there was no causal connection between the alleged
antitrust violation and the alleged injury to the general economy of the state-
the basis of a parens patriae action. Section four of the Clayton Act requires that
the injury for which treble damages is sought be "... by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws... ."6
Lower courts interpreting the section four causal connection language have
denied relief to persons who can only trace remote injuries to an antitrust viola-
tion."' As the Tenth Circuit noted in the Nationwide Auto Appraiser Seru. v.
Association of Casualty & Surety Co.:6
The directness rule has been criticized, but it appears to be through the years
a practical application of the Clayton Act, and in view of the lapse of time,
it must be assumed that it accords with the intention of Congress. 9
It would have been difficult for the State of Hawaii to satisfy the directness
requirement in a suit advanced in its parens patriae capacity. The injury was
directed at the citizens of the state, thereby causing an indirect injury to the
general economy. As the Hawaii Court noted, injury to the general economy is
only a reflection of the injury to the citizens." Although the Court could have
denied relief to Hawaii in its parens patriae capacity for lack of directness, such,
however, was not the case.7 '
Relief was denied on the ground that the state's general economy was not
64 Id.
65 Id. Citizens can combine their resources by filing a class action in order to gain "... a
more powerful litigation posture." Id. at 266. It was further noted that Congress provided
treble damages and the right to recover cost and attorney fees as an effective incentive for
citizen suits. Id.
66 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (emphasis added). The Hawaii Court did refer to lower court
opinions that had denied relief on the basis of no causal connection or proximate cause.
"The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend
the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be
traced to an antitrust violation." Id. at 262, n. 14.
67 Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 923 (1971); Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v.
Association of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
68 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
69 Id. at 929. See also Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Foods, 147 F. Supp. 907 (D.
Mass. 1956). For criticism of these cases, see Thomas, A Challenge to Conglomerates: Private
Treble Damage Suits, supra note 39, at 299-305.
70 See note 61, supra.
71 It remains unclear why the Court did not merely rule that the injury to the general
economy of Hawaii was remote. Perhaps the Court is at a crossroads where causation is
involved. For example, the Court was moving to liberalize its stand on proximate cause be-
tween injury and an alleged antitrust violation. Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach., 392
U.S. 481 (1968); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969). In Perkins, the Court
stated that "artificial limitations" of causal connection cannot be accepted. "If there is suffi-
cient evidence in the record to support an inference of causation, the ultimate conclusion as
to what that evidence proves is for the jury." Id. at 648. Since the Hanover and Perkins
cases, however, the Court has denied certiorari in cases in which the plaintiff lost on causal
connection arguments. See cases cited in note 67, supra.
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"business or property" as these terms are used in section four of the Clayton
Act."' According to the Supreme Court, " 'business or property' ... refer to com-
mercial interests or enterprises.17 3 A state can thus recover under section four for
injuries to its commercial interest-this is "business or property. '74 It can recover
".... for those injuries suffered in its capacity as a consumer of goods and ser-
vices.""* It cannot, however, recover "for economic injuries to its sovereign
interests."
781
The question toward which the balance of this article is directed is whether
employees injured by reason of an illegal corporate merger have standing to sue
for treble damages under section four of the Clayton Act. In spite of the fact
that the Sherman Act has been on the books since 1890, and the Clayton Act
since 1914, the standing of employees as a private antitrust plaintiff is not a
settled question. There are, of course, cases which support standing as well as
cases that deny standing to employees. But much of what one finds on this topic
in judicial opinions is only dicta. Surprisingly, the issue had never been, until
1972, squarely considered by any appellate court."
II. An Unsettled Question
Whether an employee has standing under the federal antitrust laws to chal-
lenge an illegal corporate merger which causes him to lose his job is a significant,
but yet unsettled question. Employees terminable at will (i.e., any person em-
ployed for an indefinite term7 9 ) found very little protection under the common
law. A salaried employee had no vested right to continued employment unless
provided by contract. Protectable personal rights were generally measured only
by contracts8 °
72 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
73 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 265.
76 Id.
77 In light of the Supreme Court's distinction between §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act, employees could more easily establish a right to injunctive relief against mergers which
violate § 7 of the Clayton Act. IM. at 261. Injunctive relief in private suits may present
additional problems not addressed by the Court in Hawaii; therefore, the topic appears too
broad to cover in this article. Primary attention in this article will be restricted to the scope
of § 4. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606 '(C.D. Calif.
1972).
78 In fact, only a few trial courts have been directly confronted with the question. Wilson
v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970) '(upholding the standing of
employees). The issue has also been presented to the Tenth Circuit. Most recently, the Tenth
Circuit denied standing to an employee discharged as a result of a merger. Reibert v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., Civil No. 72-1283 (10th Cir., Jan. 8, 1973). However, there are two cases cur-
rently pending before the same circuit. Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., Civil No. 71-1410 (10th
Cir., filed July 26, 1971); Jobe v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., Civil No. 72-1341 (10th Cir.,
filed May 10, 1972).
79 Freeman v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 239 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Okla.
1965); Willock v. Downtown Airpark, 130 F. Supp. 704, (W.D. Okla. 1955); Huskie v.
Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 74 A. 595 (1909); Ullmann v. May, 147 Ohio St. 368, 72 N.E.2d 63
(1947).
80 There was not even any protection to the employee who was injured on the job through
an act of negligence by a fellow employee. Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).




The freedom of every man to deal or refuse to deal with his fellow men has
long been recognized as an inherent and inalienable right.8 A person has a
right to refuse to enter into a contractual relationship, and the motive for such
refusal is immaterial.8" "To make his motive in exercising this privilege the sub-
ject of judicial inquiry would be a step beyond what the courts have yet done,
or what we think they can wisely do in the present stage of our economic order."8 "
In the 1908 decision of Adair v. United States,"4 the Supreme Court struck
down as unconstitutional a statutory provision that made it a criminal offense to
bar employment or threaten any employee with loss of employment because of
certain stated reasons, including membership in a labor union.85 The Court
ruled that, absent a contract between the parties,
[I]t is not within the functions of government .. .to compel any person in
the course of his business and against his will to accept or retain the per-
sonal services of another, or to compel any person, against his will, to per-
form personal services for another.86
Justice Frankfurter later noted that the Adair decision had drawn much
criticism, which was reflected in later decisions of the Court.
Neither the Commerce Clause nor the Due Process Clause was thereafter
conceived . . .to be confined within such doctrinaire and frozen bounds as
were confined the assumptions which underlay the decision in the Adair
case .... We have come full circle from the point of view in the Adair
case.
87
Actually many of the earlier cases explicitly recognized limitations to the liberty
of contract concept and the right of a person to enter into or refuse to enter into
a contract.8 8
A clear distinction must be drawn between statutory law and common law,
and between public law and private law." Action considered legal in terms of
81 Precedent for this proposition is not scarce. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160,165 11195, Adai,,-r,, v. vUite States, 200U.S ICI /1Qn0%, V.& v. __ v, ,11. 0Q T.o.
%-. '~sc I.cc5 v ... o. jt 1-1uu X A % .A V. aaynUnVLU %.At.., 4UJ U4.0.
565, 573 (1924); Huskiev. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 74 A. 595 (1909); Ullmann v. May, 147 Ohio
St. 368, 72 N.E.2d 63 (1947).
82 H. D. Watts Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 267 Mass. 541, 547, 166 N.E. 713,
718 (1929).
83 Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 1928).
84 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
85 Erdman Act, 30 Stat. 424 '(1818).
86 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908).
87 Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 239-41 (1956) (concurring
opinion). Justice Black, in Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) stated:
"This Court beginning at least as early as 1934 ... has steadily rejected the due process philos-
ophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases." Id. at 536.
88 Consider the cases cited in notes 81, 82, 83, supra. Particular attention is directed to
Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 74 A. 595 (1909).
89 This is particularly true when the statutory and public law is the antitrust laws.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Perma Mufflers v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361,
1369 (10th Cir. 1972) the court noted: "The underlying basis for the Perma Life decision is
the superior public interest in enforcing even by private action the antitrust laws." See also
Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass. 1972).
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private contract or tort law may be illegal when measured by the antitrust laws.9
Private contract rights "must be exercised in subordination to the law."'" Granted
rights must be exercised independent of the broader aspects of the antitrust laws.
It is erroneous to assume that a person has an absolute right to exercise a con-
tractual privilege in the presence of violation of the antitrust law.92
A seller has a right to refuse to deal with any person."' This may not,
however, give him the right to fix prices in violation of the antitrust laws as a
condition to a decision to deal with a buyer.94 Nor can this right to refuse to
deal be used in an attempt to monopolize.95 An employer, beyond any question,
has the right to terminate any employee not protected by a contract. As the
Adair Court reasoned:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper
is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe
the conditions upon which he will accept such Jabor from the person offer-
ing to sell it. So the right of the employs to quit the service of the em-
ployer . . . is the same as the right of the employer . . . to dispense with
the services of such employ&96
The statement of equality of right of the employer and employee is firmly
supported by common law authority. It is a principle that furnishes to the parties
the greatest amount of freedom within the private realm. With this freedom, an
employee could theoretically increase his protection by demanding a written con-
tract. The problem is that this equality of rights exists only in theory. As Senator
Wagner noted when Congress was considering passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act: 9'
To the employee out of work the job means everything-rent, food, and
clothing for his wife and children. To the large business organization no
worker is indispensable; there is always another to take his place.... The
employee must either accept the terms of employment as they are tendered
or go hungry.9
A person selling his labor can realistically demand an employment contract
only if there are many purchasers of labor. This could have been accomplished
only through the congressional purpose of the antitrust laws--"... to perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of
90 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). "Here we have an antitrust policy
expressed in Acts of Congress. Accordingly, a consignment, no matter how lawful it might
be as a matter of private contract law, must give way before the federal antitrust policy."
Id. at 18.
91 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351 (1904). In this case,
the right sought to be exercised was the right to sell stock in a company.
92 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
93 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
94 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
95 Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
96 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 '(1908).
97 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
98 75 CoNG. REc. 4916 (1932) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
[Vol. 48:623]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other.""5 With
the economic way of life envisioned under the antitrust laws, employees would
have had the freedom to move from one employer to another.' 0
The right of an employer to terminate an employee terminable at will may
be held subservient to the antitrust laws. An employee would thus have the
right to demand the preservation of the economic way of life that likewise pro-
tects his freedom. At common law, there is some authority which holds that even
an employee terminable at will had a right to an "open market." '' In Huskie
v. Griffin,'0 2 the court stated that "... one who interferes with this free market
must justify his acts or respond in damages."' 0' The right to deal or not to deal
with others is not absolute. "It is a qualified one, and the rightfulness of its
exercise depends upon all those elements which go to make up a cause for human
action."' 4
A. Authority Favorable to Standing
On the specific question of standing of employees under the federal anti-
trust laws to sue for treble damages, the judicial authority is divided. Neverthe-
less, there appears to be a current trend toward granting standing. For an em-
ployee to have standing under section four of the Clayton Act, he must be a
person injured in his "business or property" by reason of anything forbidden by
the antitrust laws. 0 5
As noted above, the Supreme Court recently held in the Hawaii case that
"business or property" refers to "commercial interests or enterprises."'" Examined
superficially, one might take this to mean that only persons operating a business
or holding tangible property would be permitted to file suit under section four.
Actually, nonbusiness persons, such as consumers, have been held to have stand-
ing to recover damages for injury resulting from an antitrust violation. °" The
term "commercial interests or enterprises" must, therefore, include more than a
business and tangible property. Based on Hawaii, "commercial interests" would
include those things capable of being measured in economic and commercial
terms.
Objection to classifying the general economy of the State of Hawaii as "busi-
ness or property" or as a "commercial interest" appeared to rest on an inability
to measure the value of, and therefore the loss to, the general economy in eco-
nomic or commercial terms.
99 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 '(2d Cir. 1945); see
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962).
100 A failure to achieve the economic way of life required employees to seek protection
through the same device that defeated their rights-the concentration of power. See note 11,
supra.
101 Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 346, 74 A. 595, 596 (1909).
102 Id. at 345, 74 A. at 595.
103 Id. at 348, 74 A. at 597.
104 Id. at 349, 74 A. at 598.
105 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
106 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
107 Id. at 263-65.
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Even the most lengthy and expensive trial could not, in the final analysis,
cope with the problems of double recovery inherent in allowing damages for
harm both to the economic interests of individuals and for the quasi-sover-
eign interests of the State.'10
The Supreme Court was willing to allow the recovery of damages for harm
to the "economic interests of individuals." Employees have a commercial interest
in their jobs. If a job or accumulated pension benefits are lost as a result of an
antitrust violation, this is a loss capable of being measured without the expec-
tation of a double recovery. It would thus be reasonable to consider employment,
even if terminable at will, under the "business or property" phrase of section four
of the Clayton Act. This conclusion finds more definite support in the Hawaii
opinion.
When the Court interpreted "business or property" to mean "commercial
interests or enterprises," Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co. "' was approvingly cited
as authority."0 The Roseland case involved the issue of standing of employees
under section four of the Clayton Act; and the issue was resolved in favor of
standing. In short, the Seventh Circuit held that "business or property" includes
"the employment or occupation in which a person is engaged to procure a liv-
ing."" Stated more fully:
The language of the statute [section 4 of the Clayton Act] is general and
all inclusive. It includes any person who shall be injured in his business or
property. We assume that the word business was used in its ordinary sense
and with its usual connotations. It signifies ordinarily that which habitually
busies, or engages time, attention or labor, as a principal serious concern
or interest. In a somewhat more truly economic, legal and industrial sense,
it includes that which occupies the time, attention, and labor of men for
the purpose of livelihood or profit-persistent human efforts which have
for their end pecuniary reward. It denotes "the employment or occupation
in which a person is engaged to procure a living.""'
Under this definition, approved by the Supreme Court, "business" means
that which habitually busies, or engages time, attention or labor. Sebastian De-
Grazia, writing about the work ethic and the innate drive of man to hold a job
and to work, places into the same category the office and plant worker, the self-
proprietor and the larger-scale retailer."' He states that "[b]usiness .. .stems
from the word 'busy' and means the state of being busy."" 4
Several courts have explicitly upheld the right of employees to sue for treble
damages under the antitrust laws. In three of the cases, the plaintiffs involved
were commission sales agents,"0 while a fourth decision, Radovich v. National
108 Id. at 264.
109 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942).
110 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
111 Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942) (emphasis added).
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 S. DEGRAzrA, THE POLITICAL COmmUNITY, A STUDY OF ANOMIE 68 (1948).
114 Id.
115 Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942); Dailey v. Quality School




Football League,'16 involved an employee of a professional football team who was
blacklisted by the league. Three other cases involved plaintiffs that could be
classified as entrepreneurs, based on their degree of ownership of the corporate
business affected."' With this classification of plaintiffs, a court could conceiv-
ably avoid extending standing to the ordinary salaried employee or wage
earner." The existing employee cases could be distinguished by the directness
of the injury.
Standing will be denied to a private antitrust plaintiff unless he can estab-
lish that there is business or property and that this business or property was in-
jured as a direct result of an antitrust violation." 9 In Dailey v. Quality School
Plan, Inc.,"' the Fifth Circuit observed that the commission sales agent cases
must be distinguished from the mere employee whose injury is only derivative."
A salesman or sales manager develops a territory which is equated to an entre-
preneurial enterprise or a distinct business. What happens with this sort of rea-
soning is a fusion of two separate statutory requirements-"business or property"
and causal connection.
2
Actually the causal connection requirement of section four of the Clayton
Act is far too complex and vague for courts to adopt and follow such a simplistic
approach. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.," the Supreme Court declared that
"artificial limitations" to causal connection cannot be accepted." 4 The Court
held that if there is sufficient evidence to support an inference of causation, the
ultimate conclusion to be reached is a question for the jury."5 "Each case con-
tains a unique combination of facts, and cannot be fitted into narrow cate-
gories."
1 6
There is no room for a distinction between sales commission employees and
the ordinary employees when faced with the issue of whether employment is
business or property. And, except perhaps in Dailey, courts have not been in-
dined to accept this distinction. 27 In Nichols v. Spencer International Press,
116 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
117 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle
Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Calif. 1972); Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers &
Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), opinion supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 157
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
118 Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1967); Mans v.
Sunray DX Oil Co., Civil No. 70-C-140 (N.D. Okla. 1971). In the Mans case, Judge
Daugherty ruled that the case, filed by a salaried employee, did not involve blacklisting nor a
commission sales agent. Id.
119 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Nationwide Auto Appraiser
Serv. v. Association of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
120 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
121 Id. at 487. This distinction made by the Fifth Circuit might be explained by the fact
that the court had earlier denied standing in a case involving employees. Centanni v. T. Smith
& Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963).
122 Radovich, the employee-football player, had standing because the antitrust violation
(blacklisting) was aimed directly at him. See Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., Civil No. 70-C-140
(N.D. Okla. 1971).
123 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
124 Id. at 648.
125 Id.
126 Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Association of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d 925, 927
'(10th Cir. 1967).
127 But see Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., Civil No. 70-C-140 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
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Inc., 128 although the plaintiff employee was a sales supervisor, the court, in up-
holding standing, referred to employment in general terms:
Granting that the antitrust laws were not enacted for the purpose of
preserving freedom in the labor market, nor of regulating employment prac-
tices as such, nevertheless it seems clear that agreements among supposed
competitors not to employ each other's employees not only restrict freedom
to enter into employment relationships, but may also, depending upon the
circumstances, impair full and free competition in the supply of a service
or commodity to the public.
1 29
Similarly, the court in Roseland interpreted the section four language, "business
or property," to include "employment or occupation in which a person is engaged
to procure a living."1 ' No distinction was made between commission salesmen
and ordinary employees.
Neither was any such distinction or limitation recognized in Vandervelde v.
Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n.'2 or Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Pub-
lishing Co."2 In Vandervelde, the court observed that "[u]ntil the last decade,
Courts denied standing to employees seeking to recover salary lost when their
employers' business was injured by an antitrust violation."'23 The court then
noted:
More recent decisions have accorded an employee standing to prove, if he
can, that his loss of salary or the other prerequisites of employment was a
sufficiently foreseeable consequence of a violation to render the connection
between the wrong and the injury direct.134
In Bay Guardian, the court, relying on Perkins, explicitly stated "... that a ques-
tion of fact can be presented by persons of 'mere employee' status."" 5
A distinction between commission salesmen and ordinary salaried employees
can be compared to a distinction between professional baseball and professional
football. There are times when a court becomes baffled by a distinction that
".... is a historical accident and an anomaly based on historical rather than legal
or even rational grounds.""' 6 This was the situation created when the Supreme
Court ruled that professional baseball was exempt from the antitrust laws.:"
Shortly after this exemption had been reaffirmed, the Court declined to extend
it to professional boxing or professional football. 3
128 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
129 Id. at 335-36.
130 Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942).
131 334 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
132 340 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Calif. 1970).
133 Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), opinion supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
134 Id.
135 Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76, 82 (N.D. Calif. 1970).
136 Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass.
1972).
137 Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). This decision followed precedent
established in Federal Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 *(1922).
138 United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Radovich v. Nat. Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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A judicial lesson to be learned from the professional baseball cases is that
courts should avoid creating precedent that cannot withstand the test of time.
In Flood v. Kuhn,' the Supreme Court was urged to eliminate the spurious
distinction which exempted professional baseball from the antitrust laws, but
included professional football. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, admitted
that the baseball exemption was, at best, of dubious validity. The exemption is
an anomaly, and an aberration confined to baseball. 4 '
Although an admitted aberration, it had stood for half a century and was
therefore entitled to the benefit of stare decisis.4 ' Still there was not a single
Supreme Court Justice who argeed with the distinction between baseball and
the other professional sports which enjoyed no exemption.'4 2 Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the Flood opinion; however, he stated that ". . . like MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, I have grave reservations as to the correctness of Toolson v. New
York Yankees ... .""' Justice Douglas, filing a dissenting opinion, noted that he
had joined the Court's opinion in the Toolsomn case. He went on to say, how-
ever, that ". .. I have lived to regret it; and I would now correct what I believe
to be its fundamental error."'1
44
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion filed in Flood appears to represent the
sentiment of the Court. Except for stare decisis, this opinion could well have been
the majority view. 145 It was first noted that Federal Club v. National League'
and Toolson ". . . are totally at odds with more recent and better reasoned
cases."' 7 One of the more recent cases to which he made reference was United
States u. Topco Associates,4 8 wherein the Court had declared:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation
of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is
to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. 49
If the Supreme Court now regrets the distinction between professional base-
ball and professional football, it is highly unlikely that it would accept a distinc-
tion between commission salesmen and ordinary-salaried employees. As Justice
Marshall observed in his dissenting opinion in Flood: "The importance of the
antitrust law to every citizen must not be minimized. They are as important to
baseball players as they are to football players, lawyers, doctors, or members of
any other class of workers."5
If the antitrust laws are the Magna Carta of the free enterprise system, their
139 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
140 Id. at 282.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 282-83.
143 Id. at 285-86.
144 Id. at 286, n. 1.
145 Id. at 288. See Amateur Softball Ass'n of America v. United States, 467 F.2d 312, 314
(10th Cir. 1972).
146 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
147 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 290 (1972).
148 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
149 Id. at 610.
150 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 292 (1972) (emphasis added).
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protection cannot be restricted to commission salesmen or blacklisted football
players. Protection must be extended to cover "members of any other class of
workers." This was explicitly done in Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.,'51
wherein the court refused to dismiss a private antitrust action filed by employees
as a class action.
The plaintiffs in Wilson were employees who worked as truck drivers and
warehousemen." 2 Claiming that their employer, Ringsby, had agreed with
other common carriers to divide up the market, clearly an antitrust violation,
the employees sought treble damages under section four of the Clayton Act.'
In compliance with the division of market agreement, Ringsby discontinued some
of its former business. This resulted in a reduction in wages and other compen-
sation to the plaintiff employees."'
Judge Arraj rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, a
motion grounded on the premise that employees lack standing. Recognizing that
the antitrust standing cases are "... . more than a little confusing and certainly
beyond our powers of reconciliation,"' 55 judge Arraj ruled that the "plaintiffs
should be permitted to bring this action."'5 8 The conclusion that the plaintiff
employees had standing was not explicitly based on a determination that employ-
ment is "business or property." This appeared to have been assumed by the
court. 5 Of greater concern to the court was the problem of directness or causal
connection of the injury to the alleged antitrust violation. 5
Causal connection is such a haunting and evasive phrase that it will possibly
never be understood to any explainable point. This is probably what Judge
Arraj felt when he said that antitrust standing cases are "... . more than a little
confusing and certainly beyond our powers of reconciliation."' 5 9 Because some
courts consider treble damages to ". . . be a severe penalty for a defendant and
a 'windfall' for a plaintiff, . . ." they have tended to develop ". . . rules designed
to limit the classes of plaintiffs which can assert an antitrust violation."'"0
151 320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970).
152 Id. at 700.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 701.
156 Id. at 702.
157 Id. The commission salesmen cases were cited by the court. See text accompanying
note 115, supra.
158 Judge Arraj's observation of the directness requirement was that "... we have some
doubt that either the 'direct injury' or 'target area' approach to standing is a correct inter-
pretation [of § 4 of the Clayton Act]." Id. The interesting point about this observation is
that Judge Arraj's court is within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, which had earlier
reaffirmed the directness requirement in Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Association of C.
& S. Go., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967). Judge Daugherty, in Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co.,
Civil No. 70-C-140 (N.D. Okla. 1971), stated that Judge Arraj had rejected the teaching of
the Tenth Circuit by reading the direct injury requirements out of the case. Judge Arraj,
however, noted in his written opinion that the Tenth Circuit, in the Nationwide Auto case,
had not mentioned any of the employee standing cases. It was therefore concluded that
Nationwide Auto was not "dispositive of the issue now before us or that the court of appeals
so intended." Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D. Colo. 1970).
159 Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970).
160 Id. See Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239
(D. Mass. 1956); Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Applebaum, 217 F.2d 101, 105 (5th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 961 (1955); Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F.
Supp. 93, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Foods, 147 F. Supp. 907,
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B. Authority Against Standing
In Corey v. Boston Ice Co.,""' a case decided in 1913, the court held that
the loss of salaries and jobs does not create a right under the antitrust laws be-
cause there is no injury to "business or property."'" 2 The plaintiffs owned a con-
siderable amount of stock in the corporation; they were directors and the prin-
cipal officers of the company. 3 It was alleged that the defendant, in violation
of the antitrust laws, acquired control of the plaintiff's corporation. Following
this acquisition of control, the plaintiffs were ousted as directors and officers of
the company." 4
Three years prior to Corey, relief under the antitrust laws was denied to a
stockholder and creditor of a corporation allegedly ruined as a result of the
defendant's illegal monopoly. 5 The court reasoned that "[t]he injury com-
plained of was directed at the corporation, and not the individual stockholder.
Hence any injury which he, as a stockholder, received was indirect, remote, and
consequential."' 6 "[I]njuries to the corporate business are not injuries to the
plaintiff's business, and for such injuries only the corporation may pursue the
statutory remedy."' "
By creating specified categories of antitrust plaintiffs, such as employees,
stockholders and creditors, to measure the directness of injury, the earlier courts
took a much too simplistic approach to causal connection. From a view of the
early standing cases, one can see an economic system of small business units in
which the principal stockholder played a multiple function. Besides being the
stockholder, he was the director, officer, and creditor of the corporation. Perhaps
because of the closeness of these roles, the courts classified them the same. Injury
to any one of these roles was considered indirect, remote and consequential.
Today the reverse may be true, at least as to injury to one in an employee
909 (D. Mass. 1956). For a discussion of this judicial hostility toward treble damage suits,
see Thomas, A Challenge to Conglomerates: Private Treble Damages Suits, supra note 39,
at 297-307.
161 207 F.2d 465 (D. Mass. 1913).
162 Id. at 466.
163 Id. at 465. Plaintiff Corey was the company treasurer, a position which earned him a
yearly salary of $2,100; plaintiff Ferris was the president and received a yearly salary of
$2,400.
164 Id. at 465-66.
Every American city has its successful businessmen, but the American success story
has been kaleidoscopic in recent years. Local giants, the boys who have grown up
with the town and made good, have shrunk in stature as rapid technological changes,
the heavy capital demands of nation-wide distribution, and shifts in the strategic
centers for low-cost production in a national market have undercut their earlier
advantages of location, priority in the field, or energy; and as Eastern capital has
forced them out or bought them out and reduced them to the status of salaried men,
or retired them outright in favor of imported management.
R. LYND & H. LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION 76 '(1937).
165 Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3rd Cir. 1910).
166 Id. at 709.
167 Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). Paul Gerli, the
plaintiff, was a stockholder, creditor, and an employee of a close corporation. But "loss of a
corporate office and the salary incident thereto" is not injury to business or property. Id.
at 960-61. See also Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389,
391 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
[February, 1973]
SELLERS OF LABOR AND CORPORATE MERGERS
status. As noted earlier, the Vandervelde court ruled that an employee had
".... standing to prove, if he can, that his loss of salary... was a sufficiently
foreseeable consequence of a violation.. ." of the antitrust laws. 68 If Corey is no
longer valid precedent, as appears to be the case, there exists very little judicial
authority in opposition to the standing of employees.
There is, however, another group of cases in which employees have been
denied standing under the antitrust laws." 9 Basically these involved a situation
where the employee raised the antitrust claim when the alleged antitrust violation
was directed at the employer company. In substance, the courts ruled that the
claim if asserted must be asserted by the company. The plaintiffs in Bywater v.
Matshushita Electric Industrial Co.:" were employees and their union of the
American manufacturer, Emerson, a company forced out of business because of
the competition of Japanese imported television sets.
Denying relief to the Emerson employees, the court ruled that it was the
company that was directly affected: "The damage to its employees is only
incidental. The damage to the unions is even more remote, one step removed
from the employees in the case of the local union and two steps in the case of
the international."'' If an antitrust suit were to be filed it should have been filed
by the person toward whom the violation was directed. This is the same theory
followed in the nonemployee cases. In fact, with the question of standing, the
Bywater court saw no valid distinction between an employee and a licensor;
between an employee and a franchisor;'. or an employee and a motion picture
producer. 4 To extend this list, there would likewise be no distinction between
an employee and a landlord. 5
Standing in private antitrust suits has been denied to the franchisor seeking
168 Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers and Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), opinion supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Perkins v. Standard
Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp.
76 (N.D. Calif. 1972).
169 Bywater v. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 1971 Trade Cas. 91,201 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 323 F.2d 363
(5th Cir. 1963); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). Conference of Studio Unions is not very helpful on this
issue since the antitrust claim was not isolated from a jurisdictional dispute between two
labor unions. One of the arguments made by the defendants was that the entire matter
belonged before the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 53.
170 1971 Trade Cas., 91,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
171 Id. at 91,203.
If the unions are permitted to sue because they have lost dues because the employees
have lost their jobs, it is hard to see why a grocer, for example, could not sue on the
theory that he has sold less food to the employees because they have less money
because their employer has been injured.
Id.
172 Id. at 91,202. See Productive Inventions v. Trico Prod. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d
166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969).
173 Bywater v. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 1971 Trade Cas. 91,202 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). See Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923 (1971).
174 Bywater v. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 1971 Trade Cas. 91,202 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). See Fields Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
175 Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292 '(2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
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to recover for injury to the franchisee;.. to the licensor seeking to recover for
injury to the licensee;177 and to landlords seeking to recover for injury to their
tenants. 7 This does not, however, mean that employees will be categorically
denied standing. In fact, to follow any such categorical analysis would be to
ignore the factual context in which causal connection must be examined. 70
The court in Nationwide Auto Appraiser explicitly warned against this: "Each
case contains a unique combination of facts, and cannot be fitted into narrow
categories."180
If clarity of standing is not increased through a comparison of employees
with franchisors and landlords, little if any additional help can be gained through
a judicial analysis. For example, the Fifth Circuit denied standing to employees
in Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc.,8 ' but then granted standing to employees
in Dailey. The Ninth Circuit denied standing of employees in Conference of
Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc.,82 but lower courts within the same jurisdiction
have upheld the standing of employees. 83 Also, standing was denied to fran-
chisors by the Tenth Circuit, 8 4 but at least one district court, in explaining the
decision, held that employees had standing.' The Second Circuit has denied
standing to licensors, franchisors, and landlords, 86 and a court from the South-
ern District denied employees standing in the Bywater"87 case; however, also
from the Southern District, employees have been granted standing."
With the apparent disparity within and among districts and circuits, about
the only conclusion to be made is that employees are not categorically denied
standing. By examining a theory behind the franchisor and landlord case, one
might get a better understanding of the position of employees. Denying standing
to a landlord does not in theory mean that he is left without any protection. In-
jury to the landlord is reflected and may be measured by the injury to the tenant.
There is thus created a possibility of a double recovery against the antitrust
offender if both the landlord and the tenant were permitted to sue.' If the
176 Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970); Nationwide Auto
Appraiser Serv. v. Association of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
177 Productive Inventions v. Trico Prod. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955); SCM
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1969).
178 Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir.
1971).
179 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 313, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
180 Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Association of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d 925, 927
(10th Cir. 1967). See also Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. 395 U.S. 642, 648 '(1969).
181 216 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963).
182 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951).
183 Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Calif. 1972).
184 Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Association of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th
Cir. 1967).
185 Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970).
186 Productive Inventions v. Trico Prod. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955); SCM
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1969); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970); Fields Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 432
F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970); Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454
F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971).
187 Bywater v. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 1971 Trade Cas. 91,201 '(S.D.N.Y.
1971).
188 Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
189 But see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
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antitrust action is filed by the tenant, against whom the antitrust violation is
directed, the chance of any duplicative recovery is avoided and both the tenant
and the landlord are protected.19
Employees may or may not fall within a pattern similar to the landlord;
such would depend on the particular facts. In the case of a merger involving
the employer corporation which results in a loss of jobs and a reduction of bene-
fits, there would be no other person in close relationship to the employee who
could be expected to initiate any litigation. There is a close relationship between
landlord and tenant; franchisor and franchisee; and licensor and licensee. The
loss to one of the parties is interrelated with the loss of the other. This would be
less accurate with the employer and the employee. A relationship obviously
exists between the two, except when this is broken by the employer's participation
in the wrongdoing. But this relationship will not as likely result in any dupli-
cative recoveries even if both the employer and the employee were granted
standing.
In Wilson, the court upholding the standing of employees noted that the
defendant employer was not the victim of the antitrust violation; it was instead
engaged in the illegal activity.'9 ' Consequently, the injured employees could
not expect any protection from any antitrust action initiated by the employer.
The Second Circuit has, however, taken a contrary position. In Calderone
Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,'92 the court considered it
immaterial that the plaintiff-landlord's lessee was a party to the conspiracy. The
injury to the landlord caused by an antitrust violation involving the tenant was
not direct regardless of the innocence or guilt of the tenant. "' "If the plaintiff
is not within the 'target area,' then it is legally immaterial whether the person
through whom the plaintiff derives his injury was a member of the conspiracy
or was innocent of any wrongdoing."' 94
Based on Calderone, an employee would have standing if he is within the
"target area." The bewildering problem is in trying to identify this "target area."
As identified by the court in Wilson, a private party would be granted ".... stand-
ing when he is 'within the sector of the economy in which the violation threaten[s]
a breakdown' and is injured by the violation."' 95 Causal connection, as explained
in Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,'96 must ".... link a specific form of illegal
act to a plaintiff engaged in the sort of legitimate activities which the prohibition
of this type of violation was clearly intended to protect.'
' 97
Is employment the sort of legitimate activity which the prohibition of cor-
porate mergers was intended to protect? In Nichols v. Spencer International
190 Admittedly this is only theory, since the landlord may not recoup his losses; the tenant
may decline to prosecute; or he may even be a party to the wrongdoing. See Calderone Enter.
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971).
191 Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D. Colo. 1970).
192 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
193 Id. at 1296.
194 Id.
195 Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970). See
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 919 '(1952).
196 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
197 Id. at 187.
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Press, Inc.,' 9 the court assumed ".... that the antitrust laws were not enacted
for the purpose of preserving freedom in the labor market, nor of regulating
employment practices as such.... .""' Nevertheless, the court upheld the standing
of employees, noting that:
[A]greements among supposed competitors not to employ each other's em-
ployees not only restrict freedom to enter into employment relationships,
but may also, depending upon the circumstances, impair full and free com-
petition in the supply of a service or commodity to the public.
200
Another court, denying standing to employees under the special facts involved,
stated ".. . that there is standing only when the injury to the plaintiff is a neces-
sary consequence of an act, intended to further the economic concentration
sought by defendants, which must occur to achieve that end." ''
A loss of jobs by reason of corporate mergers is a consequence of an act,
intended to further the economic concentration sought by defendants.V One
company has conceded that "[t]he displacement of duplicate employees is a
normal consequence of mergers whether they are legal or illegal."2 By making
such a concession, which might on the surface appear to answer the causal con-
nection question, a defendant company would be required to further define the
causal connection requirements. For example, the concession would have less
force if the plaintiff were required to trace his injury to the lessening of com-
petition or to the anticompetitive effects of a merger instead of to the merger
itself.20 4 This would, of course, muddle the causal connection issue more than it
is already.
About the only conclusion that may be drawn from a review of the authori-
ties is that "causation" is an intricate maze. Formularization of this issue is not
attainable, although the certainty of a clear formula might preserve one's sanity.
"It may ... be argued that the purpose and language of this legislation are so
sweeping that any person injured by the proscribed conduct should be considered
within the class which Congress intended to protect."2 5 Courts, however, are
unlikely to ever accept this simplistic approach to the problem of standing under
the antitrust laws. As the Supreme Court recently noted: "The lower courts
have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the
antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might con-
198 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
199 Id. at 335-36. The actual word used by the court was "granted," not "assumed." No
authority was cited in support of the statement, and as will be shown in the next section of
this article, the assumption made by the court is not accurate.
200 Id. at 336.
201 Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n of Central Cal., 1971 Trade Cas., 90,452,
90,453 (N.D. Calif. 1971) (emphasis belongs to court).
202 See J. UDELL, supra note 4.
203 Brief for Appellee at 19, Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Company, No. 72-1283 (10th
Cir., filed April 13, 1972).
204 Id. at 16. No attempt will be made to answer this additional causal connection prob-
lem since the issue is presently pending before the Tenth Circuit. It would seem, however,
that if adopted, causal connection could seldom be determined without a complete trial.
205 Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (D. Colo. 1970). See
Note, Standing to Sue For Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 CoLua.
L. REV. 570 (1964).
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ceivably be traced to an antitrust violation."208 Standing will be granted to some
and denied to others.
Once it is understood and accepted that causation is vague and uncertain,
one has increased his understanding of the problem. This vagueness and uncer-
tainty simply means that the answer will not be found in logic or by application
of a formula. One writer has observed that the judicial expressions of "... . 'cau-
sation' are only verbal formulas used by a court to express its conclusion that..."
the defendant should not be compelled to pay treble damages to the plaintiff.2'
Courts may recite incantations about directness, remoteness and causation; 0 s
however, regardless of the "factual-sounding jargon," it is "... . actually . . .
policy, rather than evidence, that is frequently dispositive.""2 9 This does not
mean, of course, that courts will arbitrarily grant or deny standing.
Guidelines and standards, such as the "target area," have been formulated
by the courts in an effort to reach rational conclusions. One of the central ques-
tions under this approach is whether employment is the sort of activity that Con-
gress sought to protect with the antitrust laws that prohibit certain corporate
mergers. If Congress did provide for this protection, the employee would have
standing if the loss of jobs and employment benefits was a "sufficiently fore-
seeable consequence" of an illegal merger.21
III. Standing of Employees Defended
A. The Work Ethic
With section four allowing any person injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws to sue for treble damages,
Congress was seeking an army of private litigants to insure a vigorous antitrust
enforcement policy.211 Senator Borah observed that "[t]here could be no safer
guardian for the Sherman Antitrust Law than the hundreds and thousands of
people who are injured by these monopolies if the law were made easy of enforce-
ment so far as they are concerned. 2 12 Private treble damage actions were con-
sidered to be an even greater deterrent than a mere criminal penalty. 21 If it
ever became unprofitable for one to violate the antitrust laws, there will be
greater respect for the law and more obedience to the law upon the part
of those who might violate it."1
2 1 4
Congressman Webb observed that under section four "... any man through-
206 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262, n. 14 (1972).
207 Pollock, The "Injury" And "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action,
57 Nw. U.L. Ray. 691, 699 (1962) '(emphasis in original).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 697.
210 Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), opinion supplemented, 344 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
211 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C., § 15 (1970). For a more complete analysis of the legislative
history of this section, see Thomas, A Challenge to Conglomerates: Private Treble Damage
Suits, supra note 39.
212 51 CONG. REc. 15,986 (1914) (remarks of Senator Borah).
213 Id. at 16,274 (remarks of Congressman Webb).
214 Id. at 15,986 (remarks of Senator Borah).
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out the United States, hundreds and thousands, can bring suit... and thus the
offender will begin to open his eyes because you are threatening to take money
out of his pocket." '215 In addition to treble damages, which were allowed under
the Sherman Act, Congress, in 1914, provided that any person threatened with
a loss could seek injunctive relief.21 Furthermore, it was made clear that these
private remedies were to be used in the prosecution of corporate mergers.
Congressman Floyd, explaining the report of the Conference Committee,
stated:
If a man is injured. . . by the unlawful acquisition of stock of competing
corporations . . . , he can go into any court and enjoin and restrain the
party from committing such unlawful acts or sue for his damages without
waiting upon the slow tortuous course of prosecution on the part of the
Government.
21 7
To be entitled to relief for a Clayton Act violation the private plaintiff is not
required to prove an actual restraint of trade. The private action can be sup-
ported upon proof of "things that lead up to restraint of trade and monop-
olies.
218
No particular effort was made by Congress to identify persons who would
have standing to sue. Senator George had assumed that the statute gave standing
to the farmer, mechanic, laborer, and small consumer.219 The same assumption
was made in 1914 when Congres passed the Clayton Act. Persons suffering the
most from the great combinations of wealth were identified as the "consuming
public" ;221 the "struggling poor of our country" ;21 the employee who loses his




What Congress envisioned in the antitrust laws and in the private remedy
provided for the enforcement of such laws is reflected in words recently expressed
by Mr. Justice Marshall: "The importance of the antitrust laws to every citizen
must not be minimized. They are as important to baseball players as they are to
football players, lawyers, doctors, or members of any other class of workers. ' 24
Congressional action taken subsequent to 1914 confinns the conclusion that the
antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of employees. This subsequent
congressional action is better understood when considered in light of the "work
ethic."
Based on a deep-rooted obligation to God, country, and to oneself, the
215 Id. at 16,175 (remarks of Congressman Webb).
216 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
217 51 CONG. Rac. 16319 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Floyd). Section 16 of the
Clayton Act provides explicitly that private injunctive relief applies to corporate mergers which
violate § 7 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
218 51 CONG. RE C. 16274 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Webb).
219 21 CONG. Rac. 3150 (1890) (remarks of Senator George). Reference was to the Sher-
man Act treble damage provision which was identical to the present § 4 language.
220 51 CONG. REc. 16043 (1914) (remarks of Senator Norris).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 16044.
223 Id. at 9088 (remarks of Mr. Mitchell).
224 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 292 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
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institutionalized work ethic requires man to work. Before the great Industrial
Revolution, Protestantism was the moving force toward establishing "work" as
the key to life. "Luther held that work is a form of serving God." '22 Calvinism
required that "[a]ll men, even the rich, must work, because to work is the will
of God."22  Idleness was shunned "as a deadly sin." '27 The work ethic or gospel
of work, as it was later called, eventually reached the United States, where it
was, in a free enterprise system, to obtain its fullest expression.228 "The American
without a job is a misfit"; he is "a doomed soul." '229
With the Renaissance, work took on a new character; there developed
"... the idea of work for its own sake-work for the sake of work-work as an
end and purpose in itself.""2 In a capitalistic society, it is through work that man
finds his nobility and worth. "His whole code of ethics is contained in the one
precept, 'work!' "2"1 Man works hard to become rich so that he can insure a
continuity of renewed activity or work.
2 32
In America, the linking of work to God is no longer so clear; nevertheless,
there are still traces and shadows of the teachings of the great reformers. 3 3 "The
modem doctrine of work affects all countries that try to solve their problems by
industrialization. ' '2"4 For a strong industrial state, it is now believed that ".... all
who can must work, and idleness is bad; too many holidays means nothing gets
done, and by steady methodical work alone can we build a great and prosperous
nation."2 An American without a job is a misfit, for it is the job that gives man
status and a sense of belonging.23 6
Imbued with religion, love of country, desire for material things, family
security, and status, work has become part of the psychology of man. "Work
itself keeps a man 'normal.' "" From childhood we have been taught that the
job is everything; without it there is complete frustration. The child has had it
"pounded" into his head "subtly and directly, consciously and unconsciously,"
that the jobless youth will be without income, without status, and therefore with-
out a sex partner.23 We have also been taught to think upon a job as some
standard of morality. Idleness is wickedness.2 9 An idle man cannot be a good
man. 24 ' And "[t]he poor are poor because by being idle or unemployed they
violate the competitive directive."24 '
225 A. TiLGHER, HomO FABER, WORK THROUGH THE AGES 49 (D. Fisher transl. 1958).
226 Id. at 58.
227 Id. at 59.
228 S. DEGRAZIA, 01 TmE, WOsu AND LEIsuRE 45 (1962).
229 Id. at 46.
230 A. TILGHER, supra note 225, at 71.
231 Id. at 134.
232 Id. at 137-38.
233 S. DEGRAzIA, supra note 228, at 45.
234 Id. at 46.
235 Id. at 45-46.
236 Id. at 46.
237 E. BAKKE, CriZENS WrTHoUT WoRK 248 (1940). Another writer has stated: "One's
job is the watershed down which the rest of one's life tends to flow." R. LYND & H. LYND,
supra note 164, at 7.
238 S. DEGRAzIA, supra note 113, at 30.
239 Id. at 51.
240 Id.
241 Id. Throughout the studies on the work ethic, one finds references to the "competitive
directive." As will be discussed later, it is the competitive directive that creates and assigns
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With work, man hopes to conquer all his ills--unhappiness, disease, poverty,
old age and time itself.242 Work as a concept has become so deeply implanted in
the make-up of Americans that it even preoccupies the notion of leisure. Give an
American worker a thirty-hour week and he will use the extra time moonlighting.
In the United States, loafing is not considered good form. "Time is money, if for
no other reason than that if you loaf you don't earn money."242
A man's job gives him status in the community.'" The job gives the father
status and authority in the eyes of his children; without his job, the father loses
his capacity for leadership. 45 And it is the job that preserves the status of man as
a husband."' Following a period of unemployment, family contempt for the
husband may become openly manifest; there may be a change in the husband-
wife relationship, with the role of the husband changing from one of dominance
to one of complete frustration.247 As one wife explained this transformation: "I
still love him, but he doesn't seem as 'big' a man."
' 4o
To understand the psychological effects of unemployment is to better under-
stand the prominence and imperativeness of the work ethic. The intensity of the
feeling of anxiety will depend on the degree to which man is removed from his
belief system.2" If adult ideologies and attitudes are only a reflection of childhood
indoctrination,2"' then the psychological impact of losing a job must be measured
in terms of the early stages of the indoctrination. There is perhaps no belief within
our society that is stronger than the work ethic.2"' Thus, if one loses his job, "he
should be gripped by acute anomie" or anxiety." 2
In the United States, a capitalistic society, unemployment results in a higher
degree of anxiety than in a country with a different economic system.25 The
work ethic is a vital part of any industrialized society; however, the work ethic
teaches one to follow "the directives of the economic ideology." '254 Under the
work ethic, we are compelled to follow the "competitive directive."2 5 This means
jobs. This then begins to show a connection between employment and the forces of free com-
petition and thereby the antitrust laws.
242 Id. at 68.
243 S. DEGRAzIA, supra note 228, at 217.
244 S. DEGRAziA, supra note 113, at 122.
245 M. KomARovsKy, THE UNEMPLOYED MAN AND His FAMILY 92-93 '(1940); Eisenberg
& Lazarsfeld, The Psychological Effects of Unemployment, supra note 2 at 379-80. E. Bakke,
supra note 237 at 241. Anonymous, Man Out of Work, By His Wife, 161 HARPER'S 195
(1930).
246 M. KOMAROVSKY, supra note 245, at 23.
247 Id.
248 Id. Another wife, describing the effects of unemployment, said that her husband, after
an extended period of unemployment, no longer sought to hide his despondency. On one
evening, she found her husband on a park bench, sobbing like a child. " 'I'm just no good,'
he said, as I pulled his head down into my lap. 'Why, here I am, almost forty, and a failure.
I can't even pay the rent and buy the groceries for my wife and child next week. I can't sell
myself.' " Anonymous, Man Out of Work, By His Wife, supra note 245 at 200.
249 S. DEGRAZiA, supra note 113, at 113-34.
250 Id. at 97.
251 See A. TILGnER, supra note 225; R. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM
(1932); M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (T. Parsons
transl. 1956).
252 S. DEGRAZIA, supra note 113, at 122.
253 Eisenberg & Lazarsfeld, The Psychological Effects of Unemployment, supra note 2, at
361; S. DEGRAzIA, supra note 228, at 368.
254 S. DEGRAzIA, supra note 113, at 122.
255 Id. at 51.
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that jobs, in the United States, are made a direct part of a competitive system.
As two companies compete for sales, individuals must compete for jobs2 5
Studies have shown that the unemployed American worker suffers a greater
degree of anxiety than do their counterparts in Russia. Where ".... economic
responsibility and competition are reduced, there is a remarkable reduction in the
incidence of nervous and mental diseases." 2 ' With the loss of a job, there "... . is
less threat to the ego, and consequently a better adjustment can be more easily
made."2 '5 Leisure, recognized as one of the fundamental rights of citizens, is even
guaranteed under the Russian Constitution.2 5 And, according to Sebastian
DeGrazia, the work ethic in Russia does not compel the people to spend their free
time moonlighting.26
Adriano Tilgher, recording the evolution of the concept of work, noted the
view that "the state has a right to insist that everyone do work as much as he
can. ' 261 This conclusion of state power was based on the idea that man ought to
live by his own works." 2 Political structures in which the government holds
certain defined powers are based principally upon a work ethic that imposes upon
man an obligation to work. For example, it is not the state that has the primary
responsibility to feed and clothe the people.
Historically, there has been a legal obligation imposed on man to support his
family. If the laws of the State of Oklahoma represent the norm, then the follow-
ing will offer an example of a state insisting that "everyone do work as much as he
can." 23 Under Oklahoma law, a ". . . husband must support himself and his
wife out of the community property or out of his separate property or by his
labor."2 4 If the husband fails to support his wife, any other person can supply
her with the articles necessary for her support and recover the reasonable value of
such articles from the husband.6 5 Where children are involved, it is the parent
entitled to custody who has the responsibility for support. Primary responsibility,
however, still rests on the father; he must be assisted by the mother, though, if he
inadequately supports the children.2 This parental obligation does not cease at
any certain point in time. Oklahoma law provides: "It is the duty of the father
and the mother of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to
maintain such person to the extent of their ability."
267
256 R. LYND & H. Lyzi, supra note 164, at 49. See also, Nichols v. Spencer International
Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1967).
257 Eisenberg & Lazarsfeld, The Psychological Effects of Unemployment, supra note 2,
at 361.
258 Id.
259 S. DEGaRAz, supra note 228, at 150.
260 Id. at 368.
How do Russians spend their free time now? Less in overtime, none in moonlighting,
more for cultural uplifting, more in collective undertakings, less with commodities,
more in political readings; but all told, everyone looks ahead to the goal apparently
reached by Americans-much more free time.
Id.
261 A. TILGHER, supra note 225, at 93-94.
262 Id. at 93.
263 Id. at 93-94.
264 32 OICLA. STAT. ANN. § 3 (1958) (emphasis added).
265 Id. § 10.
266 10 O.LA. STAT. ANN. § 4 (1966).
267 Id. § 12 (emphasis added).
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Beyond doubt, the state does have the right to insist that everyone work.
There is, however, an important correlate to the obligation imposed upon man to
work. As Tilgher further found: "The state has the corresponding duty to assure
to all its citizens the rigit to work."2 It was this duty to which Congress re-
sponded when it passed the antitrust laws. As noted in the final report of the
Temporary National Economic Committee: "It is the fundamental duty of every
society which is devoted to the principles of popular government to leave nothing
undone to preserve and guarantee the opportunity to work to every capable and
willing man."2 9
The factual setting of this clear statement of the work ethic was a congres-
sional study of the effects of economic concentration upon employment.27 Senator
O'Mahoney, Chairman of the Temporary National Economic Committee, ob-
served that "[t]he central question mark that rises before" the Committee is that
of "unemployment - unemployment of capital as well as unemployment of
men." 27' In its final report to Congress, the Committee, using the words of Lord
Coke, stated that "the monopolist that taketh away a man's trade taketh away his
life." '272 Considered in context, this statement would mean that a monopolist that
takes away a man's job takes away his life2 3 "The modem worker must find his
place in the collective or group enterprises of modem industry which utilize tools
that no individual mechanic can carry in his kit."2 4
One of the essential reasons for calling a halt to corporate mergers and
further increases in the concentration of economic power was to guarantee the
right to work to every capable and willing man. The Committee found that
unless the trend toward economic concentration was reversed, "[t]hose individuals
who will constitute the next generation will be completely foreclosed." '275 With
the antitrust laws, Congress was just as concerned with the preservation of polit-
ical freedom as it was with economic freedom. In fact the two are inseparable.
"Political freedom cannot survive if economic freedom is lost."27 '
The economic system, for example, cannot become so highly concentrated
that it makes the competitive directive, of which the work ethic is a part, inoper-
able. As described by a court, the congressional purpose for the antitrust laws
".. . was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible
cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete
with each other."2 It is within this competitive system that all men can enjoy
a high degree of economic freedom, and thereby a high degree of political
freedom.
268 A. TILGHER, supra note 225, at 94 (emphasis added).
269 TNEC REPORT at 6.
270 Id. at 691-92.
271 Hearings Pursuant to Pub. Res. No. 113 Before the Temporary National Economic
Comm. on Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 14,
at 7,098 (1940).
272 TNEC REPORT at 6.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 9.
276 Id. at 7.
277 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945); see
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 216 (1962).
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Even with the high degree of economic concentration, described as a danger-
ous level,27 Congress has consistently expressed faith in a system of free enter-
prise . 79 Employees, for the most part, must rely on the competitive system for job
opportunities and job protection. There are no special statutes which obligate
employers to hire and retain any certain number of employees.' The principal
protection provided to employees by Congress is in the antitrust laws, which were
intended to preserve a free market in which all persons could realistically sell
their labor.
To insure a policy of vigorous enforcement of these laws, Congress allowed
judicial redress to any person injured in his "business or property"' or threatened
with a loss282 by reason of any antitrust violation, including illegal corporate
mergers. Following the competitive directive, which incorporates the work ethic,
employees have standing under the antitrust laws. Work is business. "Business
... stems from the word 'busy' and means the state of being busy."28 Judicial
support for this work ethic definition of "business" was expressed in Roseland.'"
As indicated earlier, the Roseland court interpreted the word "business" as used
in section four of the Clayton Act to include ".... 'the employment or occupation
in which a person is engaged to procure a living.' ""5
B. Congressional Policy
One of the strongest expressions of congressional policy that would support
the standing of employees under section four of the Clayton Act is found in con-
nection with a statute creating an antitrust exemption. Section 5(b) (9) of the
Interstate Commerce Act relieves certain agreements approved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission from the operation of the antitrust laws.28 With ap-
proval and authorization of the Commission, two or more common carriers may
consolidate or merge their properties.8 7 This approval exempts the merger from
the proscription of section seven of the Clayton Act. 8
With this antitrust exemption, Congress recognized a need for some con-
solidation of common carriers; however, it also recognized that consolidation
could impair the rights of workers. Before passing upon any agreement to merge
or consolidate, the commission was, therefore, directed to give weight to "the
interests of carrier employees affected."2 8 More precisely, the statute directs the
278 TNEC REPORT at 3.
279 Id. at 7.
280 There are of course many statutes designed to protect employees against certain evils-
discrimination based on race, age, union activity and the like. We are also seeing some govern-
ment activity involving the question of jobs. These incidents, however, reflect a breakdown
of free competition. Such was the predicted result if we failed to reverse the trend toward
economic concentration.
281 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
282 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
283 S. DEGRAzIA, supra note 113, at 68.
284 Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942).
285 Id.
286 49 U.S.C. § 5(b)(9) (1970).
287 Id. § 5(2) (a).
288 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
289 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (c)*(4) (1970).
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Commission, as a condition of its approval, to ".... require a fair and equitable
arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected."29
In its order of approval the Commission shall include terms and conditions
providing that during the period of four years from the effective date of such
order such transaction will not result in employees of the carrier or carriers
by railroad affected by such order being in a worse position with respect to
their employment... *291
In its original form, the proposed Transportation Act merely provided that
in approving a common carrier merger, the Commission must consider "the
interest of the carrier employees affected." 2" During debates on the bill, however,
Congressman Harrington offered an amendment which would prohibit Commis-
sion approval of any merger which resulted in a displacement of employees:
Provided, however, That no such transaction shall be approved by the Com-
mission if such transaction will result in unemployment or displacement of
employees of the carrier or carriers, or in the impairment of existing employ-
ment rights of said employees.29 3
The stated purpose of this amendment was to protect the railroad worker
against unemployment or any impairment of employment rights as a result of con-
solidations.294 Eighty per cent of the savings effected by railroad consolidations
and mergers was said to come out of the pockets of workers. 95 Congressman
Geyer argued:
Consolidations and big mergers of railroads are of benefit only to the
already over-rich big bankers and security holders, and certainly can never
be of benefit to railroad employees. Consolidations and mergers will mean
abandonment of terminals, shops, and tracks; not only will the employees
lose their jobs, but businessmen will lose their patronage, communities will
be deprived of railroad service .... 29
The Harrington amendment was approved;297 however, the Senate bill did
not contain a similar provision. In conference, the amendment was compromised,
and the present wording of the employee statutory protection provision was ap-
proved 2 9s Based on this statutory protection, the Commission withheld approval
of a merger agreement between the Great Northern Railway Company and the
Northern Pacific Railway Company. One reason given was that the merger
would result in the termination of 5,200 employees. 99
290 Id. § 5(2) (f).
291 Id.
292 H. R. REP. No. 1217, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1939).
293 84 CONG. REC. 9,882 (1939).
294 Id. (remarks of Congressman Harrington).
295 Id. at 9,883.
296 Id. at 9,884 (remarks of Congressman Geyer).
297 Id. at 9,887.
298 H. R. REP. No. 2832, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69 (1940). For a discussion of the
Harrington amendment, see Railway Labor Ass'n v. United States, 339 U.S. 142, 150 (1950).
299 Motion to Affirm by ICC at 4, Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U.S. 491 '(1970).
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Efforts to merge the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific date back to
the year 1893. After the first efforts failed,"'0 a second attempt at consolidation
was made through the formation of a holding company-the Northern Securities
Company. In striking down this combination s 1 as a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, the Supreme Court held:
The mere existence of such a combination and the power acquired by the
holding company as its trustee, constitute a menace to, and a restraint upon,
that freedom of commerce which Congress intended to recognize and protect,
and which the public is entitled to have protected.30 2
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, declared that "[iff such combination be
not destroyed ... the entire commerce of [an] immense territory. . . will be at
the mercy of a single holding corporation, organized in a State distant from the
people of that territory."03
The merger of the two railroad lines was finally approved by the Commission
and the Supreme Court, but only after the employees had received "guarantees
and job assurances for the rest of their working lives."' " In approving this
merger Chief Justice Burger observed for the Court that all employee objections
had been eliminated."0 5 Later, it was held in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
Nemitz,3° an employee class action, that the fair and equitable arrangement to
protect the interest of employees approved by the Commission cannot sub-
sequently be reduced by a postmerger collective agreement between the railroad
and union. One of the principal purposes of the statute "....... was to provide
mandatory protection for the interests of employees affected by railroad con-
solidation.' ""'
This special employee protection provided by Congress to railroad employees
affected by mergers was necessary because the protection afforded by free com-
petition was eliminated. Persons employed in other segments of the economy are
protected by the congressional proscription against corporate mergers. For this
protection to be meaningful, however, it appears reasonable to conclude that
employees have standing under section four of the Clayton Act to challenge illegal
corporate mergers.
A rather absurd conclusion results from a denial of standing to employees
300 Pearsall v. The Great Northern Ry., 161 U.S. 646 (1896).
301 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
302 Id. at 327.
303 Id. at 327-28.
304 Motion to Affirm by ICC at 7, Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U.S. 491 (1970).
305 Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U.S. 491, 500 (1970).
306 404 U.S. 37 (1971). This is a significant extension of employee protection, since the
statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter.. ., an agreement pertaining to
the protection of the interests of said employees may hereafter be entered into by any
carrier or carriers by railroad and the duly authorized representative or representatives
of its or their employees.
49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (f) (1970). The majority of the Court in a four-three decision, ruled that
this statutory language authorized only a pre-merger collective agreement which supplies the
minimum measure of fairness. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, supra at 43.
307 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37, 42 (1971), citing Railway Labor
Ass'n v. United States, 339 U.S. 142, 148 (1950).
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displaced or injured by reason of an illegal merger. Protection would be extended
to employees affected by a merger authorized by Congress, but would be denied
to employees adversely affected by a merger prohibited by Congress.
C. The Administrative Procedure Act: An Analogy?
At least since Associated Industries v. Ickes,"' when Jerome Frank made
prominent the phrase, "Private attorney generals," there has developed a pre-
sumption in favor of standing of persons seeking to challenge governmental action.
The Supreme Court has greatly liberalized its position on standing to allow courts
to examine the merits involved in legitimate cases." 9 As noted in California
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited:'1 "The right of access to the courts is indeed
but one aspect of the right of petition."
1 1
Where the action of a governmental agency is the subject sought to be
reviewed, there remains only a slight difference in what a person seeking review
must show. In Data Processing Service v. Camp"2 standing of the petitioner was
tested on the basis of the Administrative Procedure Act, which grants standing to
a person ". . . aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute.1313 To satisfy the standing requirements, one need not show that he has
a "legal interest," for this goes to the merits of the case;314 the question of standing
is ". . . whether the interest sought to be protected... is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected... by the statute.., in question."
31 5
Justice Brennan, concurring in the result and dissenting, in both Data
Processing and Barlow v. Collins,"' disagreed that it should be necessary for the
petitioner to prove that he fell within the zone of interests to be protected by the
relevant statute. According to Justice Brennan, it is enough if the plaintiff
....... alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact.' "31
It was believed that consideration of the zone of interest would require a court
to consider the merits of the case at a preliminary stage. This, feared Justice
Brennan, would limit the number of persons who would be allowed to seek
review.
Actually, Justice Douglas and the majority of the Court sought the same
expansive reading for standing. As the Court stated in Barlow: "[J]udicial review
of such administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which
must be demonstrated."31 The Court opined that ". . . unless members of the
protected class may have judicial review the statutory objectives might not be
realized." '19
308 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
309 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
310 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
311 Id. at 510.
312 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
313 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
314 Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
315 Id.
316 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970) (concurring in result and dissenting opinion).
317 Id. at 168.
318 Id. at 166.
319 Id. at 167.
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In Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.,3 20
Judge Burger observed that ". .. courts have resolved questions of standing as
they arose .... ,3 21 Petitioners, in this case, had sought standing as members of
the listening public; however, standing had generally been denied unless a person
could show some economic injury or electrical interference." This did not,
however, mean that these were ".... the exclusive grounds for standing." ''2 At
the time, "... . such persons might well be the only ones sufficiently interested to
contest a Commission action.
3 24
It was argued that the agency could effectively represent the interest of the
listener without the aid or participation of the listener who seeks to fulfill the
role of private attorney general. To this argument, Judge Burger replied:
... one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they
are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it
is no longer a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual
experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely on it. s2 5
A strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action
has developed; nonreviewability is an exception which must be dearly demon-
strated. 26 If the presumption and its underlying rationale were applied in anti-
trust cases, a private plaintiff would have standing if he alleged that the chal-
lenged conduct caused him injury in fact, and if he fell within the zone of interests
to be protected by the relevant statute. An employee displaced by a corporate
merger proscribed by the antitrust laws could, under the liberalized philosophy,
satisfy the standing requirements.
About the only difference between the two situations is that the defendant in
one case is a government agency and in the other a private corporation. In Data
Processing, the statute upon which standing was determined was section 702 of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, which provides: "A person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.' 'aar The Court does not, however, require that standing to review
agency action be predicated solely upon this statute.12 1 Whether a statutory right
or Constitutional guarantee is involved, the central question is whether the com-
plainant arguably falls within the zone of interests to be protected. Under the
antitrust laws, the standing provisions that must be relied upon by a private
plaintiff are sections four and 16 of the Clayton Act:
320 359 F.2d 994 '(D.C. Cir. 1966).
321 Id. at 1000. Before Judge Burger became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, he had
manifested support in liberalizing standing requirements. See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d
570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
322 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994,
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
323 Id. at 1000-01.
324 Id. at 1001.
325 Id. at 1003-04.
326 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
327 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
328 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained .... 319
Any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief...
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. .... 330
There is a similarity between these two standing provisions and the standing
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Each is worded in general, rather
than specific terms, and each has causal connection language. Section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act grants standing to a person aggrieved by agency
action; section four of the Clayton Act gives standing to a person injured in his
business or property; and under section 16, standing is granted to any person
threatened with a loss. To identify the person who would have standing, at
least under section 702, the key is to determine if the person falls within the zone
of interest sought to be protected. 3 ' Under the antitrust laws, the same approach
is used to identify the person injured in his business or property-Does the person
fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the antitrust laws?
To satisfy the causal connection requirement, a person relying on section 702
of the Administrative Procedure Act must show that he is adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action. Under sections four and 16 of the Clayton Act, the
person must show that he is injured by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws. Standing was, at the lower court level, denied to the plaintiff in
Barlow because the governmental officials had "....... not taken any action
which directly invade[d] any legally protected interest of the plaintiffs.' ",332 It was
enough that the plaintiffs fell within the zone of interests and that they alleged
that they suffered injury in fact."'
As indicated previously, the only real difference is with the person being
sued-a government official or a private corporation. The critical question is
how much weight will be given to this difference. To liberalize standing in suits
against the government without following the same philosophy in private anti-
trust suits would be to give the private corporate defendant an advantage not en-
joyed by the government. This would be a strange phenomenon if allowed to
exist, since private organizations have, principally through mergers, attained
power that exceeds that of our political subdivisions of government. 3 4
In a practical sense, it makes little difference whether the lives of men are
controlled by economic power or by political power33 5 One can be just as bene-
ficial or just as obnoxious as the other. The Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee concluded that "[i]f the political structure is designed to preserve the free-
329 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
330 Id. § 26.
331 Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
332 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163 (1970) (emphasis added).
333 Id.
334 TNEC REPORT at 5-6. States are prohibited by the Constitution from entering into any
agreement or compact with another state or foreign government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Private corporations, created by states, have, however, grown so large that they frequently enter
into international cartel arrangements. TNEC REPORT at 8.
335 General Motors, with assets in excess of $18 billion and sales in excess of $28 billion '(for
the year 1971), employs about one out of every 100 U.S. civilian workers. FORTUNE, May, 1972
at 187-90.
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dom of the individual, the economic structure must not be permitted to destroy
it."3 ' Little difference can exist or be allowed to exist between the respective
functions of government and private economic organizations:
Governments are instituted among men to serve men; men were not created
to serve government. It is not the function of government nor of those to
whom the duties and responsibilities of government are temporarily en-
trusted to direct and command the activities and the lives of men. It is the
sole function of government to produce and preserve that order which will
permit men to enjoy to the utmost that free will with which they were en-
dowed by an all-wise Creator.
If, however, the political organization which we call government is
called into existence by men for the benefit of the entire community, a prin-
ciple which as Americans we must all acknowledge, it is equally true that the
economic organizations, called into existence by men to meet their material
needs, are likewise justified only to the degree in which they serve the entire
community. 37
A basic reason for the antitrust laws, including the private remedies provided
by Congress, was to stop business organizations from destroying the freedom of
the individual. Employment is one of the most basic freedoms held by men;
employment is life itself. In Gilchrist v. Bierring,"3 ' the court noted:
The right to earn a living is among the greatest of human rights and, when
lawfully pursued, cannot be denied. It is the common right of every citizen
to engage in any honest employment he may choose, subject only to such
reasonable regulations as are necessary for the public good.
339
"[T]he right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen
profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the
'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment...." 34 0 If the govern-
ment is not allowed to destroy the right of employment, business organizations
must not be allowed to destroy it."" For protection against arbitrary govern-
mental action, the Court has created a presumption in favor of standing to seek
judicial review. 42 For employees injured by business organizations engaged in
antitrust violations, Congress has provided a private remedy in the form of treble
damages and injunctive relief.
Following the principles, if not the holdings, developed in Data Processing
and Barlow, one could offer a reasonable argument to support a presumption in
favor of employee standing under the antitrust laws.34 Although these precise
336 TNEC REPORT at 5.
337 Id.
338 234 Iowa 899, 14 N.W.2d 724 (1944).
339 Id. at 909, 14 N.W.2d at 732. Labor is, in fact, more important than capital and
deserves greater protection. Maintenance Employes v. United States, 366 U.S. 169, 186 (1961)
(dissenting opinion).
340 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 263 (1967).
341 See note 336 and accompanying text, supra.
342 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) ; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) ; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
343 Application in private cases of the holdings of Data Processing and Barlow has been
generally rejected by courts. Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers U., Loc. No. 610, 440
F.2d 124 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 '(1971); Collegian v. Activities Club of New
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holdings may not apply to private cases, the judicial philosophy expressed should
be relevant, particularly in a factual setting involving the private enforcement
of the antitrust laws. The only generalization about standing which is necessary
is that there must be a case or controversy, a constitutional limitation on courts;
any other generalization on the subject is "largely worthless as such."
'3 "
IV. Conclusion
The issue of standing of employees to challenge illegal corporate mergers
under the antitrust laws boils down to one simple question: Will employees be
granted standing under sections four and 16 of the Clayton Act? Present judicial
and legislative authority tends to support an affirmative answer. The question as
stated, however, suggests that the issue is not yet fully resolved. Furthermore, the
question suggests the existence of unresolved policy issues. 4
Standing to challenge an illegal merger may be denied to employees because
of the heavy burden which treble damages would impose on the corporation. To
be sure, there could be a heavy burden. For example, if two large corporations
merge and consolidate their facilities, treble damages paid to thousands of dis-
placed workers could be colossal. In response to the policy consideration, it should
first be stated that the granting of standing would not automatically result in a
treble damage recovery. Standing insures to the employees only a right to have a
court consider the merits of the case.
An obvious, although important, fact is that before any liability for treble
damages arises, the court must find the corporate merger to be illegal under the
antitrust laws. Once this is discovered, the corporation becomes the wrongdoer
and must then bear the risk of its own wrong."' As the Supreme Court stated in
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. "' "... ,... [O]ne who deliberately goes peril-
ously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross
the line.' "348 The deterrent force of treble damages was the reason that Congress
expressed such strong favor for the private antitrust suit. "Any man throughout
the United States, hundreds and thousands, can bring suit . . . , and thus the
offender will begin to open his eyes because you are threatening to take money
out of his pocket." 4 9
To allow the wrongdoer to escape the risk of a treble damage claim filed by
the thousands of workers displaced by a corporate merger would be to eliminate
the only deterrent force provided by Congress for enforcement of the Clayton Act
York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Calif.), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1158 '(9th Cir. 1971),
cert. granted, 405 U.S. 915 (1972).
344 Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
345 For one who believes in legislative supremacy and opposes judicial activism, it is difficult
to accept judicial policy considerations in the application of statutory rights. Thomas, Statutory
Construction When Legislation is Viewed As A Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 191 (1966);
Thomas, Conglomerate Merger Syndrome-A Comparison: Congressional Policy With En-
forcement Policy, supra note 16, at 483-506. Nevertheless, a pragmatist will not ignore the
involvement of policy in judicial decisions. What a statute means is what a judge says it means.
346 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946).
347 380 U.S. 374'(1965).
348 Id. at 393.
349 51 CONG. REc. 16,275 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Webb).
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proscriptions-in which corporate mergers are included. 5 ° The corporate wrong-
doer would thus be allowed to deprive a man of his job, or eliminate thousands
of jobs, and thereby profit from its illegal act at the personal expense of the work-
ingman. Financial savings secured by a corporation through mergers and con-
solidations come in the form of a reduction in salaries, pension payments, and
other employee benefits.
For a court to deny the right of legal redress to employees displaced by
mergers is to impose the penalty on these persons for a wrong committed by the
employer-corporation. As observed by the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee, when you take away the job of a man, you take away his life. 5' The
pain is no less whether the job is lost because of the corporation's illegal act, or
because the court, for some nebulous policy reason, denies the employee access to
the courts.
Without making any attempt to identify the cases, one can state as a con-
clusion, without any fear of contradiction, that courts have been making extraor-
dinary strides in the area of civil rights. Positive and humanistic action has
been taken by courts in cases involving legislative reapportionment, housing,
welfare, racial discrimination, and criminal procedure. Civil rights and civil
liberties may, however, have little meaning if the economic rights of people can
be destroyed by the corporation in defiance of the antitrust laws. When Congress
was seeking ways to stop corporate mergers and the trend toward economic con-
centration, it was observed that "[p]olitical freedom cannot survive if economic
freedom is lost."' 352 We cannot long allow a system to exist that permits corpora-
tions to grow strong while the people grow weak.
As President Roosevelt once observed: "Industrial efficiency does not have
to mean industrial empire building." 53 The object for halting mergers and other
devices tending toward economic concentration was to remove the things that kept
private enterprise ". . . from furnishing jobs or income or opportunity for one-
third of the population. '354 President Roosevelt believed that "[n]o people, least
of all a democratic people, will be content to go without work or to accept some
standard of living which obviously and woefully falls short of their capacity to
produce."
3"5
With the antitrust laws vigorously enforced, Congress was seeking to free
the common men from an oppressive sense of helplessness created by their domi-
nation by the economic power concentrated in the hands of a few. Unless this
power could be diffused among the many, it was feared there would come a day
when the power would be transferred to the public and its democratically respon-
sible government. 56 Ignoring these deep congressional convictions, there are
350 Congress eliminated the criminal provisions in the Clayton Act and placed greater
reliance on private enforcement. Thomas, A Challenge to Conglomerates: Private Treble
Damages Suits, supra note 39, at 318-19.
351 TNEC REPORT at 6.
352 Id. at 7.
353 Id. at 13. The remark was made by Roosevelt in an address to Congress, April 29,
1938, in which there was an urgent call for a halt in economic concentration.





theorists that deny all relief to employees and, for that matter, to all other private
plaintiffs who seek to challenge corporate mergers."'
There is no merit in the suggestion that employees should be denied the right
to challenge corporate mergers. Nevertheless, the antitrust laws have been on the
books since 1890, and the issue still remains unresolved. 5 Individual employees
have, as indicated earlier, been granted standing; however, employees as a class
have not pursued any recourse in the courts for a redress of their grievances. In
searching for an answer to explain this inaction, one is left only to speculate. It
does appear to be settled, however, that the inaction cannot affect a right of
employees to seek the relief.3 59
Granting standing to employees will create reliable private attorney generals
to insure a swift and vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. Because these in-
dividuals will be motivated by their loss of jobs, and not by any economic policy
that favors a relatively calm and rational approach, corporate mergers are likely
to come to a halt. This, of course, was the clearly enunciated congressional
purpose behind the laws. Congress was seeking blind obedience to the antitrust
laws; and to insure this obedience and to avoid the calm and rational approach
toward enforcement, Congress placed primary reliance on the persons injured.8 0
As an example of a policy approach, the unchecked growth of conglomerates
has not resulted from any lack of statutory standards or any judicially conceived
exemption. They have grown out of a lack of enforcement or as part of a con-
sciously conceived plan that comes from a calm and rational approach. 6' Con-
glomerates were allowed to grow into industrial multinational empires even in
light of the clear statements that the conglomerate merger "... . is one of the most
detrimental movements to a free enterprise economy." '62  Supported by an
economic philosophy in favor of eliminating or spreading market risk, conglomer-
ates have also been strongly criticized for the same reasons: "The justification of
private profit is private risk. We cannot safely make America safe for the busi-
nessman who does not want to take the burden and risks of being a business-
man."
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357 Professors Kaysen and Turner urge a denial of standing to all private persons seeking
to challenge corporate mergers. Believing that the standards of § 7 are too vague and un-
certain, they state: "It is unfair for private plaintiffs to collect treble damages for conduct the
illegality of which cannot be readily determined in advance." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
supra note 47, at 257. Although their assumption was perhaps accurate in 1959, much of the
uncertainty in the statute has been removed by the increased experience and understanding of
the Supreme Court.
358 Most recently, the Tenth Circuit ruled that discharged employees do not have standing
to challenge a corporate merger through a class action. Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
Civil No. 72-1283 '(10th Cir., Jan. 8, 1973). See Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., Civil No.
71-1410 (10th Cir., filed July 26, 1971); Joebe v. Amerada Petroleum Co., Civil No. 72-1341
(10th Cir., filed May 10, 1972).
359 United States v. duPont & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
360 The most effective check placed on the Attorney General, according to Congressman
Webb, was the private suit seeking treble damages and injunctive relief. 51 CONG. REc. 16,274
(1914).
361 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, supra note 19, at
1313.
362 95 CONG. REc. 11497 (1949) '(remarks of Mr. Boggs).
363 TNEC REPORT at 15 (statement by President Roosevelt).
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